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The Reform of the Gender Recognition Act: Government 
Consultation (2018) catalyzed a heated debate on trans rights 
and trans inclusion in the United Kingdom, in a context 
where, as Hines (2018a, p. 1) notes, greater trans visibility 
and legal protections for trans people have caused something 
of a backlash. The proposed reforms aim to replace the cur-
rent medicalized process of gender recognition with one 
based on self-identification and self-declaration. The most 
prominent voice opposing the reforms was raised under the 
banner of gender-critical feminism. Academics from various 
disciplines, including philosophy and law, have lent their 
voices to the gender-critical project. In general, gender-criti-
cal feminism advocates reserving women’s spaces for cis 
women. A few, though not all, gender-critical feminists make 
exceptions for some trans women, such as those who have 
undergone gender reassignment surgery. Apart from seeing 
the proposed reform as threatening women’s spaces, gender-
critical feminists, or many of them, are critical of the use of 
puberty blockers for self-identified trans children. Many 
applaud the kind of radical feminism championed by Jeffreys 
(2014) and Raymond (1979).
Gender-critical interventions over the proposed reforms 
have tended to take the form less of scholarship published in 
academic outlets than shorter online pieces in websites such 
as The Conversation, the Oxford Human Rights Hub Blog, 
and Medium.com, as well as contributions on Twitter. While 
academics often treat nonacademic online platforms as dis-
semination fora complementary to their academic output, the 
use of these platforms by gender-critical academics in the 
recent debate on gender recognition has tended to replace 
scholarly production. This is probably due to gender-critical 
academics’ desire that their contributions should reach a 
wide audience, be timely, and be able to engage their nonaca-
demic support base. It has also been suggested that academic 
outlets are biased against the work of gender-critical femi-
nists (Stock, 2018c). As I argue, however, that the gender-
critical case against trans inclusion is not well made, any 
reluctance to publish gender-critical work in academic out-
lets might be legitimate, rather than biased.
I start by briefly explaining what the reforms propose, and 
why gender-critical feminists oppose them. I then consider in 
greater detail the arguments made by Kathleen Stock, a 
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philosopher who, as far as I am aware, has developed the 
fullest gender-critical case against trans inclusion, at least in 
the U.K. context. In other words, I take as the target of my 
critique the best in gender-critical feminism. I argue that, 
judged by a philosophical standard, Stock’s claims and argu-
ments are problematic. Among other things, I contend that 
Stock’s key argument against trans inclusion—namely, the 
risks that inclusion of trans women in women-only spaces 
poses to cis women—is not developed in a way that sound 
uses of practical reason could endorse. Finally, as I take 
Stock’s arguments as representative of broader problems in 
gender-critical thought, I suggest some explanations that 
help us see these problems as something more than a coinci-
dence of unrelated, accidental missteps.
A terminological clarification: in using the term “trans” 
and “cis” in this article, I have in mind Serano’s (n.d.) defini-
tion of “transsexual” and “cissexual.” “Transsexual” refers 
to people who identify with, and live as, the sex that was not 
assigned to them at birth. This may include undergoing gen-
der reassignment surgery. Everyone else is “cissexual.”
Gender-Critical Responses to the 
Proposed Reforms to the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004
The centerpiece of proposed reforms to the U.K. Gender 
Recognition Act is the introduction of a new system for the 
legal recognition of gender identity. According to section 2 
of the Act as it currently stands, a trans person can only 
obtain a gender recognition certificate after a relatively 
lengthy process, requiring them to provide evidence of 
having lived in their acquired gender for at least 2 years, as 
well as a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria. It is 
widely recognized that the process is bureaucratic, and 
experienced as intrusive and demeaning by many trans 
people, particularly because the requirement of a diagnosis 
of gender dysphoria reinforces a view of trans identities as 
pathological (Baggs, 2018; Davy, 2011, ch. 5; Gender 
Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill: consultation, 2019, 
§§ 3.19-3.30; Reform of the Gender Recognition Act: 
Government Consultation, 2018; Stonewall, 2018, p. 20; 
U.K. Parliament, 2016, §§ 32-44).
The proposed reforms would replace this system with 
one where a trans person can obtain a gender recognition 
certificate on the basis of making a statutory declaration (or 
something like it) about the gender they identify with 
(Reform of the Gender Recognition Act: Government 
Consultation, 2018). The Scottish Government has also 
recently published a draft bill for consultation, which, if 
enacted, will reform the Gender Recognition Act to intro-
duce a self-declaration gender recognition model in respect 
of Scotland alone (Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) 
Bill: consultation, 2019). Ireland, Malta, Norway, Denmark, 
Portugal, Belgium, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile 
have already adopted a similar system, and its adoption has 
been advocated by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (2015).
Gender-critical feminists have argued that the introduc-
tion of such a system in the United Kingdom would be dam-
aging to cis women, because it would undermine their safety 
in women-only spaces, by giving “males,” or emboldening 
“males” to seek, access to such spaces. Part of this argument 
points to the risk that cis men would impersonate trans 
women to gain access to such spaces and women’s bodies 
(Auchmuty & Freedman, 2018). Another part is that trans 
women are not women/females in the relevant sense, because 
they were not born and socialized as women, and hence lack 
the distinctive experience of sex-based subordination; on this 
view, trans women are both not among the proper recipients 
of the protection offered by women-only spaces, and cast as 
possible violators of those spaces and the bodies of cis 
women (Stock, 2018g). As Cooper (2019) puts it, “[t]oilets, 
changing rooms, girls’ youth organisations, hostels, and pris-
ons emerge [here] as the dystopic terrain of [cis] women’s 
vulnerability to enduring predatory male behaviour.”
The legal response to this argument has been twofold. 
First, the reforms, by facilitating the acquisition of a gender 
recognition certificate, will make no difference to the ques-
tion of access to women-only spaces. This is because those 
who are not natal females currently need not show a gender 
recognition certificate to access these spaces (Sharpe, 2018c). 
This is an effect of sections 7 and 29 of the Equality Act 
2010, which, combined, require people who either have 
undergone gender reassignment (which need not involve any 
surgical or hormonal intervention) or plan to do so to be 
treated without discrimination in the provision of goods and 
services. Service provision here covers trans people’s access 
to spaces reserved for the gender they identify with. As a 
result, trans people already have a right to access gender-
segregated spaces congruent with their gender identity, 
regardless of their gender presentation, and regardless of 
whether or not they are in possession of a gender recognition 
certificate. Second, it is argued that the current law already 
provides cis women with adequate safeguards from cis men 
impersonating trans women, or from any malfeasant trans 
women themselves (Sharpe, 2018c). This is because section 
28 of Schedule 3 to the Equality Act 2010 allows service 
providers to make exceptions to the rule of access without 
discrimination, if differential treatment is “a proportional 
means to achieving a legitimate aim.”
The gender-critical argument against trans inclusion has 
also been tackled on the philosophical plane. It has been 
argued that gender-critical feminists make a mistake on at 
least three points: first, in assuming or arguing that only cis 
women are in need of the protection of women-only spaces; 
second, in insisting that trans women’s experience of social-
ization mirrors that of cis males; and third, in not treating 
gender identity seriously as relevant to determining who 
counts as a woman (Finlayson et al., 2018). Gender-critical 
interventions have also been taken to task for their failure to 
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pay credible tribute to decades of feminist, trans and queer 
philosophical work debating how to define “woman” and 
how trans women are positioned in relation to that concept 
(Bettcher, 2018). The gender-critical insistence that the cat-
egory of woman and/or female must be centered on bodily 
sex (as a biological category) has also come under criticism 
(Hines, 2018b). Gender-critical feminists tend to draw a 
sharp distinction between sex, as a biological reality, and 
gender, as the social construction of sex. In response, femi-
nist critics of gender-critical feminism insist that we have no 
unmediated access to biological realities: they too become 
cognitively significant to us through discourse, including the 
discourse of biology, which is itself (like any other discursive 
domain) structured by political values. Thus, defining the 
concepts of “women” or “females” (as gender-critical femi-
nists do) by reference to biological sex is itself a political 
choice, rather than one that can claim to neutrally reflect 
what the world is “really” like (Conaghan, 2018). It has also 
been argued that moral obligations of solidarity toward trans 
women require their inclusion in the category of woman and 
in women-only spaces (Finlayson et al., 2018).
Philosophical Scrutiny of Gender-
Critical Arguments
Kathleen Stock has emerged as a particularly lucid voice in 
the gender-critical camp. Stock’s ideas are highly regarded 
among gender-critical feminists (a look around Twitter is 
instructive). Stock presents an articulate, relatively compre-
hensive, and moderate form of gender-critical feminism. For 
instance, when, on January 30, 2019, Stock distanced herself 
on Twitter from the anti-trans tactics of some feminist activ-
ists, she was widely criticized by Twitter users who would 
normally support her. For these reasons, this article centers 
Stock’s arguments: As I see it, engaging her arguments has 
implications for the credibility of the gender-critical project 
as a whole.
Except for one piece appearing in different versions in 
The Philosopher and on Medium.com (Stock, 2019b), Stock 
has not, at the time of writing this article, presented her gen-
der-critical case against trans inclusion in the form of tradi-
tional academic outputs. Rather, she has done so in a series 
of blog-type pieces in Medium.com, as well as articles for 
The Economist, Quillette, The Conversation, and The Article. 
This is complemented by bite-sized interventions on Twitter.
Of these outlets, the Conversation (n.d.), Medium.com 
(n.d.), and the Article (n.d.-b) position themselves as striking 
a middle ground between “ordinary” journalism and schol-
arly writing. Stock (2018d) is very clear that her interven-
tions are attuned to the nature of her essays’ publication 
outlets, and that she does not take herself “to be doing sub-
stantive academic philosophy in those essays.” Despite this 
disclaimer, Stock’s profile, as it appears in connection with 
her online pieces, always carries the description of Professor 
of Philosophy. Stock (2018d) also expressly states that in 
those pieces she is addressing, among others, academic phi-
losophers. And, in clarifying she was not doing “academic” 
philosophy, she seems to implicitly concede she was doing 
“philosophy” nonetheless—albeit of the footnote-less, con-
versational, nonacademic variety.
Thus, I think Stock’s arguments against trans inclusion 
call for a critical evaluation in light of philosophical stan-
dards. In carrying out this evaluation, I discuss some of the 
problems with (a) Stock’s case against including gender 
identity conversion therapy among the kinds of conversion 
therapies that should attract legal and policy disfavor; (b) 
Stock’s case against including trans women in women’s 
spaces; and (c) Stock’s case against including trans women 
and trans men within the meaning of “female” and “male,” 
respectively.
Begging the Question in the Argument 
About Gender-Identity Conversion 
Therapy
Stock has made a case against the understanding of conver-
sation therapy used by the LGBT charity Stonewall in its 
advocacy against this practice. Her case, however, is ques-
tion-begging. Stock (2018e) clarifies the meaning of conver-
sion therapy adopted by Stonewall by quoting from the 
charity’s own definition: “Conversion therapy . . . refers to 
any form of treatment or psychotherapy which aims to 
change a person’s sexual orientation or to suppress a per-
son’s gender identity (my italics).” Stock believes that gen-
der identity conversion therapy (as understood by Stonewall) 
should not be included within the kinds of conversion thera-
pies that reasonable people should object to, or the govern-
ment outlaw.
Stock’s (2018e) argument is to the effect that Stonewall’s 
definition of conversion therapy is internally incoherent. It 
imposes on doctors a twofold requirement to avoid both sex-
ual orientation conversion therapy and gender identity con-
version therapy; but she thinks it is impossible for them to 
comply with one without violating the other. She illustrates 
this by reference to Margie, a hypothetical 14-year-old who 
is female-bodied, sexually attracted only to women, and 
identifies as a boy.
If Margie’s self-diagnosis (“I’m a boy”) is questioned by the 
therapist, the therapist can be construed as . . . “converting” . . . 
a trans child to a “cis” one. If, on the other hand, Margie’s self-
diagnosis is affirmed unquestioningly, the therapist is 
effectively failing to affirm Margie in a sexual orientation of 
lesbianism; something which also looks like conversion by 
omission. (Stock, 2018e)
The point made in the last sentence is question-begging 
because it builds (part of) the argument’s conclusion into its 
premises. Specifically, the argument must assume Margie to 
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be (a girl and) lesbian, to reach the conclusion that Margie, if 
affirmed in her self-defined gender identity, is effectively 
being converted from lesbianism to heterosexuality. The 
problem is that, as a matter of stipulation, Stock (2018e) 
clarifies that in this hypothetical scenario, there is “no prior 
underlying psychological story to give us the ‘real’ fact about 
Margie’s transness, or lack of it; nor to tell us why Margie 
would reliably know that fact.” If so, then no conclusion can 
be reached about whether or not Margie is lesbian (a cis girl 
desiring women) rather than heterosexual (a trans boy desir-
ing women). The whole argument that affirming Margie’s 
self-diagnosis would result in “converting” Margie’s sexual 
orientation classification then flounders. At most it could be 
said that, as we do not know, by hypothesis, Margie’s “true” 
gender identity, the therapist, in affirming Margie’s self-
diagnosis, runs the risk of “converting” Margie to hetero-
sexuality (not that the therapist is so converting Margie). In 
the same way, the therapist, in failing to affirm the self-diag-
nosis, runs the (very real) risk of trying to convert Margie to 
cissexuality, rather than merely being liable to being “con-
strued” as so doing. Forsaking accuracy, here, means obscur-
ing the reality of the situation, and the argument can be 
faulted for looking like it is trying to persuade by deploying 
rhetoric, rather than sound philosophical justifications. In 
any case, even the conclusion that the therapist runs the risk 
of “converting” Margie to heterosexuality is unwarranted, 
for the reasons explained in the next section.
Equivocation in the Argument About 
Gender-Identity Conversion Therapy
Crucially, Stock’s argument also suffers from the so-called 
fallacy of equivocation (see Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, n.d.-c) which obtains when one trades on the 
ambiguity created by the use of multiple meanings of the 
same word. The equivocation is on the meaning of “sexual 
orientation conversion therapy.” Stonewall’s statement, 
quoted by Stock, that conversion therapy aims to change 
sexual orientation is based on the (usual) understanding of 
conversion therapy in terms of conversion of someone’s sex-
ual object choice. On this understanding, if Margie is 
attracted to women, a doctor would be engaging in sexual 
orientation conversion therapy only if she were trying to 
change the object of Margie’s sexual attraction from women 
to men. But by affirming Margie in his gender identity, the 
doctor is not changing Margie’s sexual object choice.
Stock’s argument makes it look like a doctor affirming 
Margie in his gender identity would be converting Margie’s 
sexual orientation only because it equivocates on the mean-
ing of conversion therapy. By the time it reaches its conclu-
sion, the argument has smuggled in an understanding of 
sexual orientation conversion therapy quite unlike the one 
initially presented by quoting Stonewall. Under this new 
understanding, conversion therapy is a matter of clinically 
reclassifying a patient from one category (“lesbian”) to 
another (“heterosexual”), where the categories and conver-
sion process are designed in such a way that re-classification 
is entirely independent of (a) changes in the patient’s sexual 
object choice; (b) changes in their experience of sexual 
desire or sexual identity; (c) an intention on the doctor’s part 
to effect these changes, or to support the patient in their 
intention to achieve them. This is a seriously implausible 
understanding of conversion therapy. Even if Stock’s argu-
ment did not suffer from equivocation, and consistently 
adopted this understanding of conversion therapy from the 
start, we would have to reject the argument, because it is 
built on a concept that is both contrived and implausible.
Secundum Quid and Division Fallacies 
in the Argument About Trans 
Women’s Exclusion From Women’s 
Spaces
I now turn to Stock’s argument against trans women’s access 
to women-only spaces. Stock (2018d) states that her
concern about female-only spaces is about legal self-
identification without any period of “living as a woman,” prior 
male socialisation in a way which exacerbates the tendency to 
violence against female bodies, and the fact that many self-
identifying trans women . . . retain both male genitalia and a 
sexual orientation towards females.
As she clarifies, if “we think there are good reasons to retain 
same-sex spaces generally, in terms of protecting females 
from a small number of malfeasant males, these reasons 
don’t cease to operate when males self-identify as women” 
(Stock, 2018g). This argument appears confined to trans 
women who, in accordance with the proposed reforms, will 
be able to obtain a gender recognition certificate on the basis 
of self-declaration/identification. In practice, however, the 
argument commits Stock to the broader proposition that we 
should protect cis women (and possibly also trans men 
assigned female at birth) from malfeasant (natal) males by 
excluding all (natal) males from women-only spaces. This is 
because of two reasons. First, the pre-reform system, as far 
as access to women-only spaces is concerned, already works 
like a self-identification one (Finlayson et al., 2018); so 
Stock’s arguments, if they are valid, are so in the pre-reform 
system too. Second, if Stock’s arguments that trans women 
lack socialization as women and often retain both male geni-
talia and a desire for women are valid arguments against 
access, they would apply even if trans women’s access to 
women-only spaces were granted (as it is not) only upon 
their obtaining a gender recognition certificate in accordance 
with a medical diagnosis.
Indeed, Stock (2018c) elsewhere clearly states that she 
favors a policy that would exclude “all [natal] males from 
female-only spaces”: this clearly covers all trans women, 
regardless of whether they have a gender recognition 
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certificate and how they obtained it. In a world in which 
violence is overwhelmingly committed by men, and in 
which sexual violence is committed overwhelmingly by 
men and against women, adopting such a policy may seem 
entirely sensible. But what about people who, despite being 
assigned male at birth, identify as women? Here the suspi-
cion might arise that the rule perhaps should not be treated 
as a (categorical) rule, but as a rule of thumb. If so, in treat-
ing it like a categorical rule, Stock’s argument may be suf-
fering from the so-called secundum quid fallacy (see Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.-a).
Rules are entrenched generalizations: It is in their nature 
to be suboptimal, that is, over and under-inclusive vis-à-vis 
their background justification (Schauer, 1991b). Whenever 
we propose to treat a given prescription as a (categorical) 
rule, we know that we will have to tolerate some measure of 
suboptimality, and we are prepared to do so in light of the 
advantages of treating a prescription as a rule (predictability 
of outcomes, efficiency in enforcing the rule, etc.). But 
sometimes those advantages are outweighed by the costs, 
because the suboptimality that rules carry with them through 
their insensitivity to particulars is a failure of justice and 
fairness (Schauer, 1991a).
So, we might be justified if we feel uncomfortable about 
the deceptively simple statement that the reasons for exclud-
ing natal males from women-only spaces “don’t cease to 
operate when males self-identify as women” (Stock, 2018g). 
It may turn out to be the case that categorically excluding 
trans women from women-only spaces is suboptimal (unfair 
and unjust) in ways that we should not tolerate. If so, it might 
be because Stock’s argument for reserving women-only 
spaces to cis women or natal females suffers from a further 
fallacy—division. This obtains when one reasons, unsoundly, 
that what is true of the whole (e.g., folks assigned male at 
birth) is also true of (some of) the parts that make up the 
whole (e.g., trans women assigned males at birth) (see 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.-b).
Stock (2018b) argues, “The problem here is male violence 
. . . [We] have no evidence that self-declared trans women 
deviate from male statistical norms in relevant ways.” 
Something true of natal males as a class (their proneness to 
violence against women) is here assumed to be true of trans 
women as a (sub)class, on the basis of an absence of evi-
dence. The effect of the argument is to treat as evidence of 
sameness an absence of evidence of difference, despite the 
fact that the reasonable assumption to make is just the oppo-
site—namely, that there should be a difference in behavioral 
patterns between natal males as a class (the vast majority of 
whom are cis men), and trans women as a class. For
there is clearly a difference between the experience of a child 
who is treated by others in way that are characteristic of boys 
and also feels like a boy, and a child who is treated by others in 
ways that are characteristic of boys whilst feeling that they are 
really a girl. (Finlayson et al., 2018)
Elsewhere, Stock’s (2018c) rationale for keeping trans 
women out of women-only spaces is different. She states,
If the evidence shows (as, in fact, it is already showing) that 
some males—whether genuinely “truly” trans or just 
pretending—turn out to pose a threat to females, and it’s really 
hard to tell in advance which ones will, can’t we then make a 
social norm and/or law to exclude all [natal] males from female-
only spaces . . . ?
It is not clear what evidence Stock has in mind here. Prison 
figures appear to indicate that a high percentage of trans 
inmates in English and Welsh prisons have convictions for 
sex offenses, but Sharpe (2018a) showed such figures to be 
misleading before Stock authored the piece in which she 
claims that there is evidence of a threat to females. In any 
case, the best statistical evidence available (published before 
Stock’s remark about the evidence we have) points precisely 
in the opposite direction: policies that give trans women 
access to women-only spaces without discrimination do not 
result in increased risks to cis women (Hasenbush et al., 
2019). While Stock (2019d) has, more recently, dismissed 
these findings on the ground that “plenty of time is needed to 
see the real impact,” her dismissal is far too off-handed. 
Hasenbush et al.’s (2019) peer-reviewed, quantitative study 
is clearly the most directly relevant to the question of trans 
women’s access to women-only spaces (unlike, for example, 
the study cited by Stock and others in Allen et al., 2019, 
which is, instead, about unisex spaces). To appreciate its rel-
evance, specifically, to the U.K. context, note that in 
Massachusetts—where the study was carried out—access to 
sex-segregated spaces is governed by the same self-identifi-
cation principles and practices as are applicable in the United 
Kingdom under the Equality Act, as seen in the governmen-
tal guidance (Healey, 2016) that explains how these policies 
are to be operationalized.
Given that the hardest evidence we have indicates that 
opening women’s spaces to trans women does not increase 
risks to cis women, it seems that in citing evidence in support 
of her policy to deny trans women access to these spaces, 
Stock might have in mind individual incidents of trans 
women (or their impersonators) harming cis women. It is 
important to note that here Stock does not treat evidence of 
incidents of violence by individual trans women as evidence 
of proneness to violence by trans women as a class. Rather, 
she thinks that natal sex offers the only workable watershed 
to keep malfeasant trans women (or their impersonators) out 
of women-only spaces, even if it comes at the cost of keeping 
out all harmless trans women too, and regardless of how 
prone to violence trans women may be as a class (relative to 
natal males as a class or cis men as a class). Effectively, the 
logic of this argument displaces the question (which else-
where Stock did seem to treat as significant) of how likely, 
statistically speaking, trans women assigned male at birth are 
to commit violence against women. As long as some trans 
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women—Stock (2018c) even concedes they might actually 
all be cis men impersonating trans women—commit vio-
lence against cis women, it is imperative to exclude from 
women-only spaces all trans women. Admitting trans women 
“poses unacceptable harm to the original occupants of the 
category ‘woman’” (Stock, 2018g).
Errors of Practical Reason in the 
Argument About Trans Women’s 
Exclusion From Women’s Spaces
This—that admitting trans women into women-only spaces 
poses unacceptable harms to cis women—ultimately is 
Stock’s justification for trans women’s exclusion from 
women-only spaces. The argument appears consequential-
ist—that is, roughly, it judges the goodness or badness of a 
policy admitting trans women to women-only spaces by 
reference to its consequences, or the consequences it is 
likely to have (the definition of consequentialism is con-
tested; Raz, 1986, pp. 267-268). Consequentialist consider-
ations are an important part of our everyday uses of practical 
reason, and are routinely (and appropriately) used as a basis 
for much policy-making. It does not follow, however, that 
Stock and other gender-critical feminists are right in main-
taining that, as admitting trans women into women-only 
spaces might result in some trans women (or their imper-
sonators) harassing or assaulting cis women, then no trans 
women must be admitted. An example will immediately 
illustrate that this is not how policy choices are made, nor 
the way to sensibly determine whether a certain course of 
action is morally sound.
Consider jobs in which workers come into contact with 
children. We know that, statistically, men are much more 
likely to be sexually predatory toward children. We also 
know that it is difficult to tell in advance which men will 
offend (at least if they do not yet have relevant convictions). 
Finally, we know that some men who come into contact with 
children in their work will offend against them. Yet we do not 
exclude all men from working with children, even if using 
gender as a watershed would prevent those offenses. Why 
does the good of minimizing child sexual abuse not lead us 
inexorably to the conclusion that we must outlaw all male 
teachers and coaches? Because our practical reason recog-
nizes complexity: We readily see that even the most highly 
desirable states of affairs (minimizing abuse of children) do 
not have simple, quasi-mechanistic implications for policy or 
decision-making, and that they do not justify the indiscrimi-
nate suppression of other goods (even less important ones, 
such as professional vocations).
Some of the considerations we take into account when 
making these judgments are the relative seriousness of harms 
that may follow from different courses of action, the likeli-
hood of those harms eventuating, how narrowly tailored a 
certain policy or course of conduct is to achieving the 
relevant good, and so on. There will also be considerations 
having to do with the nature of competing values. Some of 
them may work like deontological constraints on consequen-
tialist thinking. In other words, practical reason may lead us 
to decide against a certain policy or course of action because 
of the kind of thing that it is or instantiates, regardless of the 
beneficial consequences it might bring about. Such consider-
ations often have to do with some understanding of respect, 
political “equality,” or moral independence, and an apprecia-
tion of how the adoption of certain rules in and of itself vio-
lates these goods.
These kinds of considerations do not properly feature in 
Stock’s arguments against trans inclusion. Indeed, remember 
that my rough definition of consequentialism—as a mode of 
assessing the goodness or badness of different policies or 
courses of conduct—spoke of consequences that conduct or 
policy either produces or is likely to produce. Yet, as we have 
seen, at least in one of its versions, Stock’s consequentialist 
argument ultimately denies that the likelihood of the envis-
aged harms to cis women matters. Effectively, Stock’s argu-
ment is asking us to assign more weight to a possible harm to 
cis women than the certain harm that exclusion will bring to 
trans women: that of being denied the safety (and other ben-
efits) that women’s spaces provide. And it is asking us to do 
so when the best evidence shows that giving trans women 
access to women’s spaces does not in fact increase risks to 
space users’ privacy or safety (Hasenbush et al., 2019).
Why a Separate but Equal Solution Is 
No Solution
I argued that the harm of trans women’s exclusion must be 
given due consideration, as must the certainty of its occur-
rence if trans-exclusive policies are adopted. The proposal of 
a separate-but-equal solution, which would see parallel ser-
vices and spaces segregating trans women from cis women 
(Stock, 2019d), does not give that harm serious consider-
ation. It runs up against the objection that the numbers of 
trans women are too low to make trans-women-only spaces 
and services viable. As Finlayson et al. (2018) note, “includ-
ing trans women in women-only spaces is by far the most 
practical approach to take under the current circumstances.” 
Even if this objection could be overcome, however, there is 
another, more fatal one.
This has to do with another kind of harm that occurs ipso 
facto by virtue of a policy of trans exclusion, whether or not 
complemented by a “separate but equal” corrective. This is 
“the harm of being treated as unreal and unintelligible”—
specifically, unintelligible as a woman (Cooper, 2019). This 
harm is similar in kind to the illocutionary subordination that 
attends the performance of hate speech acts (Zanghellini, 
2003). (This is, emphatically, not the same as arguing that, in 
recommending her policy, Stock, who expressly disclaims 
transphobia, Stock, 2018a, is engaging in hate speech.)
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Our social world is arranged in a way that makes exclu-
sion from the sex/gender they claim—on the basis of a lack 
of “authentic” belonging (Serano, 2007)—central to trans 
subordination. As with other forms of social subordination, 
trans exclusion has not only material dimensions (Blair & 
Hoskin, 2018; Hargie et al., 2017; Moolchaem et al., 2015; 
Movement Advancement Project and GLSEN, 2017; Rondón 
Garcia & Martin Romero, 2016; Serano, 2013; Stonewall, 
n.d.; Yona, 2015), but also discursive ones that work in 
accordance with the logic of so-called performatives. 
Performatives are utterances that do things with words: spe-
cifically, they accomplish something in the act of saying it 
(Austin, 1975). The classical example is marriage—in the act 
of declaring a couple married, a celebrant brings about a 
change in their normative status, provided the celebrant is 
the right person in the right circumstances. This presupposes 
a normative background (that is a set of laws, conventions, or 
other rules) governing all those matters: who qualifies as a 
legitimate celebrant, what the right circumstances are for the 
performative to do its work, what marriage status means in 
terms of spouses’ rights and obligations, etc.
Butler (1990) famously argued that gender is performa-
tive, in the sense that it is called into being through repeated 
speech acts (starting with the assignation of gendered names 
at birth): these construct, consolidate, and stabilize gender-
based subjectivities, though in a way that is always contin-
gent and open to failure. But the idea of performative is also 
useful to grasp the discursive dimensions of social oppres-
sion. Deadnaming, deliberate misgendering, transphobic and 
trans-exclusionary speech acts and policies normally work 
like performative utterances: they secure/reinstall the ideo-
logical subordination of trans people by virtue of their conso-
nance with the normative background (reflected across 
different discursive domains, including the criminal law: see 
Sharpe, 2018b) that represents and normalizes trans people’s 
relation to the sex/gender they claim as fraudulent, inauthen-
tic, second best. If there is a valid deontological argument in 
the debate about trans inclusion, I think this comes closest to 
it. It suggests one reason for objecting to policies such as 
those recommended by Stock, just for the kind of things that 
they are—namely, inherently subordinating of trans people. 
Yet, I am reluctant to treat even this harm as a knock-down 
argument with conclusive force in all circumstances, regard-
less, for example, of the nature of who manages and/or funds 
the relevant single-sex space (the State, local government, 
activists, volunteers, etc.).1
I do argue, however, that an adequate consideration of this 
harm is conspicuous by its absence in gender-critical interven-
tions that recommend a policy of blanket exclusion from 
women’s spaces of all trans women (or all those who have not 
undergone gender reassignment surgery, or all those who have 
not obtained a gender recognition certificate in accordance 
with medicalized procedures). In addition, when it comes to 
the different question of individuals deciding on different pos-
sible courses of action legally open to them, I maintain that the 
ethically sound choice is to treat the combination of material 
and discursive harms enacted by trans exclusion as a quasi-
deontological constraint that recommends defaulting to trans 
inclusion whenever there is no concrete evidence (relating to 
the specific trans person seeking inclusion) that requires 
excluding them. As Finlayson et al. (2018) argue, honoring 
“the subjective sense” of one’s gender identity “is, in most 
contexts, the right political and ethical response.”
It is important to understand how trans-inclusive policies, 
courses of action, or linguistic usages do not have a subordi-
nating effect on cis people in the same way in which I argued 
their trans-excluding equivalent has on trans people. In an 
exchange on Twitter, Stock has stated that trans women 
claiming a female identity could be said to deny her reality as 
a female and lesbian (see Figure 1).
In fact, the logic of performatives strongly suggests that 
trans-inclusive utterances/policies/choices do not deny my 
reality as a cis (gay) man, or Stock’s reality as a cis (lesbian) 
woman, nor otherwise have any harmful illocutionary effect 
on those of us that fit into these categories. This is because 
the normative/conventional background that is needed to 
activate any (purportedly) harmful (reality-denying) power 
of trans-inclusive speech acts is missing. Given the norma-
tive background that subordinates trans to cis (rather than 
vice-versa), the idea that trans-inclusive utterances could 
deny or cause illocutionary harms to cissexual realities is, to 
me at least, philosophically unintelligible.
Why Trans-Inclusive Practices Do Not 
Threaten the Concept of “Female,” 
“Male,” “Lesbian,” and “Gay”
Stock (2018b) has also argued that trans inclusion on the 
ground of self-identification/declaration threatens “a secure 
Figure 1. Twitter exchange between Professor Stock and 
Professor Sharpe.
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understanding” of concepts intimately related to “woman”—
namely, “female” and “lesbian.” It is hard to see this threat as 
a real one. After all, conceptually, “trans maleness” and 
“trans femaleness” presuppose “cis maleness” and “cis 
femaleness” as their other—namely, the case of female and 
male for which no transition, no reaching across, is required: 
the case of femaleness and maleness already on this side of 
(= “cis”) their sex.
Indeed, Stock’s own reflections on the concepts of “sex,” 
“male” and “female”—and her very observation that “if we 
were to lose [the concept of female and male] . . . we would 
have to reinvent them” (Stock, 2018b)—suggest very con-
vincing reasons why her apprehensions that trans inclusive 
practices imperil these concepts are not well-founded (even 
when these practices are based on self-identification/declara-
tion). Specifically, Stock (2019b) states that given “that the 
human species continue to reproduce, one might well look 
askance at any conclusion saying that there are no underlying 
material facts about maleness and femaleness to which 
humans can have reliable epistemic access.” This, as I 
explain below, refutes her own argument that trans inclusion 
imperils the concepts of “male” and “female.”
Stock (2019b) argues, correctly, that “sex [i.e., maleness 
and femaleness] is not determined by any single, unitary set 
of essential criteria,” and that “there is no single set of fea-
tures a person must have in order to count as male or female.” 
She goes on to state that: (a) “you do still need to possess 
some” female (biological) sex characteristics to count as 
female; (b) that this is “a real, material condition upon sex-
category-membership”; and (c) that “medical professionals 
[assigning sex]. . . rely upon an established methodology, 
aimed at capturing pre-existing biological facts” (Stock 
2019b). Stock presents (a), (b), and (c) as if they were true 
without qualification. In fact, they only describe how, for 
very legitimate reasons, sex is understood and assigned 
within the discourses of biology and medicine; but our every-
day usages of “male” and “female” may well be more capa-
cious. It does not follow, of course, that there is no connection 
at all between these discursive domains—biology and the 
everyday. Rather, something like the biological meaning of 
“male” and “female” refer to the central cases of “male” and 
“female” as those terms feature in everyday usages. But 
those usages, if trans-inclusive (as they should be), will also 
cover, legitimately and usefully, noncentral cases of those 
selfsame terms.
There really is no good reason to fear that such trans-
inclusive practices will imperil “maleness” and “female-
ness” as concepts. It is the very fact that those concepts have 
and will retain central cases that puts to rest any such fear. 
What makes something like the biological meanings of 
“male” and “female” the central cases of everyday usages of 
those words is “[o]rdinary-life truth seeking, a certain level 
of which is essential for survival”; this “involves a swift 
instinctive testing of innumerable kinds of coherence against 
innumerable kinds of extra-linguistic data” (Murdoch, 
1992). Reproduction is a key aspect of human experience: 
The existence of each of us and the perpetuation of the 
human species presuppose it. The extra-linguistic reality of 
the dioecious configuration of human bodies, which is func-
tional to human reproduction, means both that the concept 
of “female” and “male” are here to stay, and that their cen-
tral cases will remain well-understood, even after we give 
up on trans-exclusionary attitudes, practices, and policies. 
To put it another way: trans-inclusive linguistic usages, poli-
cies, and so on, cannot threaten the distinction between the 
concepts of “male” and “female,” which hinges on the non-
disposability of the central cases of those concepts.
For similar reasons, it is difficult to agree with Stock that 
characterizing as “gay” trans men attracted to men, and as 
“lesbian” trans women attracted to women, “leaves us with 
no linguistic resources to talk about that form of sexual ori-
entation that continues to arouse the distinctive kind of big-
otry known as homophobia” (Stock, 2019d). After all, our 
linguistic conventions make cissexual womanhood and man-
hood the central or paradigmatic cases of “womanhood” and 
“manhood”; cissexual (though not necessarily gender-con-
forming) lesbianism and male homosexuality the central or 
paradigmatic cases of “lesbianism” and “male homosexual-
ity,” and so on. This will not change. First because of the 
prevalence of cissexual women/men and cissexual lesbians/
gay men, in terms of sheer numbers, relative to trans women/
men and trans lesbians/gay men. Second, because of the 
ways in which the concepts of “man,” “woman,” “gay,” “les-
bian,” “cis,” and “trans” sit together with the concepts of 
“male” and “female,” which reference an extra-linguistic 
reality, of which, as we have already seen, we cannot but take 
notice. Given these linguistic and empirical facts, a trans-
inclusive use of the terms “lesbian” and “gay” does not carry 
the dangers Stock (2019d) worries about.
Having recourse to the idea of central and noncentral 
cases of “male” and “female” is much preferable to Stock’s 
more rigid and narrow understanding of those concepts, 
which would reserve their use to designate, respectively, 
only biological males and females. It is politically preferable 
for all the reasons readily understood by those feminists who 
embrace trans-inclusive language. And it is descriptively 
preferable because it enables us to account for trans-inclu-
sive everyday usages of “male” and “female” without having 
to ascribe them to the speaker’s delusions (noncentral cases 
of a concept are not delusion-based; they are, simply, not the 
paradigmatic cases of a concept).
Overemphasizing Sex-Based 
Subordination
I think that the source of some of the problems discussed 
above, and more generally some of the problems with the 
gender-critical case against trans inclusion, is in the way 
structural subordination on the basis of sex dominates gen-
der-critical analysis to the virtual exclusion of everything 
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else. Critical scholars call this way of proceeding “presup-
posed paranoid structuralism” (Halley, 2008).
Invoking this label carries some risks: It tends to elicit 
strong and negative reactions because the term “paranoid” 
immediately raises the specter of mental illness. But that is 
emphatically not how the term is used in either critical lit-
erature or in this article (which is not interested in offering, 
unlike Elliot and Lyon, 2017, p. 360, a psychoanalytic 
reading of gender-critical work). Work on paranoid struc-
turalism in critical studies uses “paranoid” not as a “pathol-
ogizing diagnosis” (Sedgwick, 2002, p. 126)—although, 
of course, the central case of “paranoia” is indeed a psychi-
atric pathology—but as a playful metaphor for the “herme-
neutics of suspicion” employed by searing critical work 
directed at revealing the covert structural determinants of 
social relations. As Sedgwick (2002) explains, “in the 
hands of thinkers after Freud, paranoia has . . . candidly 
become less a diagnosis than a prescription” (p. 125). That 
is, critical scholars are deliberately committed to “para-
noid” readings of social reality, treating such “paranoid” 
commitment as a productive scholarly attitude. It is only 
when “paranoid structuralism,” instead of generating 
hypotheses that are then tested, is presupposed as an article 
of faith in critical work that employs it, that it becomes 
problematic (Halley, 2008).
The concept of presupposed paranoid structuralism, then, 
is intended to alert those of us doing work directed at unveil-
ing and challenging social hierarchies (i.e., “paranoid” work) 
to some of the risks inherent in what we do. The risk is that 
our ideological and methodological investments in the struc-
turalist binaries we care about (males oppressing females; 
nonqueers oppressing queers, etc.) can lead us to presuppose 
their validity, instead of taking their validity as a hypothesis 
that must remain open to falsification. Presupposing, rather 
than hypothesizing, the validity of structuralist binaries “can 
lead you,” in Halley’s (2008) words, “to miss noticing other 
things that are going on, things that just can’t, and even if 
they can probably should not, be forced into [the explanatory 
frameworks you construct on the basis of your favorite bina-
ries]” (p. 191).
Take the tweet in the figure above. It suggests a lack of 
appreciation of two crucial points: first of the disanalogy 
between claiming that trans-exclusionary practices deny 
trans realities, and claiming that trans-inclusive practices 
deny cis realities; and second of the ethical imperative to 
take into account the harm of denying trans realities when 
navigating the questions of trans recognition and trans 
inclusion. Such disanalogies, and such needs, are precisely 
the kind of “things that are going on,” but that one can 
“miss noticing” (Halley, 2008, p. 191) if one inadvertently 
presupposes the singular centrality, ubiquitous validity, 
and superior explanatory power of the (natal) male/ (natal) 
female binary in structuring social relations. Here are some 
other things we might miss noticing, if we make that 
presupposition:
a. Even assuming that the socialization of trans girls mir-
rors that of cis boys, the fact that trans girls do not 
identify with maleness can be expected to make a dif-
ference to the outcomes of such socialization (Finlay-
son et al., 2018).
b. It is a mistake to treat “violence and discrimination 
against trans women . . . as if it were unconnected to 
that faced by cis women” (Finlayson et al., 2018).
c. Saying “Not giving people everything they desire is 
not a denial of their humanity” (Allen et al., 2019) 
amounts to an insensitive dismissal of the serious ar-
gument that trans exclusion is ipso facto harmful.
d. The claim that women “are a culturally subordinated 
group . . . [while] at best, trans women are a distinct 
subordinated group; at worst . . . members of the dom-
inant group” entirely discounts the ways in which sex, 
gender, and cis/trans status intersect. These intersec-
tions produce more complex, shifting, and context-
dependent power relationships than are captured by 
the M > F formula.
e. A dubious assumption underlies this statement: “[T]he 
fact that our concept-application [of, e.g., ‘woman’] 
might indirectly convey disadvantage towards some 
social groups [e.g., trans women] is not itself a reason 
to criticise the concept use, because the concept use 
has a further valuable point” (such as “to pick out a 
distinctive group, relative to recognisably important 
interests”) (Stock, 2019e). The dubious assumption 
here is that the “valuable point” of a restrictive use of 
the concept will be lost if the concept is broadened. 
The assumption is dubious because even in its broad, 
inclusive use, the concept retains a readily identifiable 
central case.
Halley (2008) argues, controversially, that much feminist 
scholarship suffers from presupposed paranoid structural-
ism. Cossman et al. (2003, p. 635) find Halley’s arguments 
more compelling if confined to radical feminism. Although 
Catharine Mackinnon does not advocate trans exclusion 
from women’s spaces (Williams, 2015), and although Andrea 
Dworkin was a trans ally (Stoltenberg, 2020), it seems sig-
nificant that many (not all) gender-critical feminists are also 
radical feminists. In any case, I think there is something to 
gain from entertaining the possibility that presupposed para-
noid structuralism is a source of shortcomings in gender-
critical arguments, particularly if it has the effect of prompting 
some gender-critical soul-searching.
Doing Philosophy and Debating Policy 
in the Age of Social Media and Digital 
Platforms
The case against trans inclusion in the United Kingdom, as 
I indicated, has been presented primarily through social 
media and blog-type or journalistic online platforms 
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lacking the traditional prepublication checks of academic 
peer review. I think these media of presentation are also 
partly to blame for the shortcomings in gender-critical 
arguments. My arguments in this section are less specifi-
cally about Stock’s own contributions, than about the gen-
der-critical project as a whole. An implication of my 
argument is also that, to the extent that supporters of trans 
inclusion make wide use of these digital fora, they too sub-
ject themselves to conditions that are less than conducive to 
reaching genuine understanding.
A distinctive feature of these fora is that they are instances 
of writing only in a hybrid sense: They are, rather, forms of 
“secondary orality and secondary literacy,” concepts used to 
“emphasize the immediacy and dialogic nature of digital 
communications, even though they may occur in replicable, 
searchable text formats” (Stewart, 2016). Twitter, where 
much gender-critical discourse is produced, reproduced, and 
shared, is unlike writing and like speech, having strict word 
limits on individual tweets, and being designed to encourage 
to-and-fro exchanges of bite-sized bits of communications: 
“academic Twitter enables a collapsed space of engagement, 
wherein the analytic, text-based content of scholarship is 
shared via often-casual, participatory and dialogic forms of 
exchange” (Stewart, 2016). Even the Article, the Conversation 
and Medium.com partake as much of the features of speech 
as the written word, given the short length of the pieces they 
publish, their “like,” “leave a comment,” and “share” (includ-
ing “share on Twitter”) features, and, in the case of Medium.
com (which was launched by a Twitter co-founder, Kumar, 
2018), the conversational style it accepts. Indeed, the Article 
(n.d.-a) expressly characterizes itself as a “publisher that is 
also a social media platform.”
One might argue that far from being a problem, it is an 
advantage that the media favored by many gender-critical 
feminists are more “spoken” than “written” (or, at least, par-
take as much of speech as of writing). One here might point 
to Murdoch (1992), who follows Plato in arguing that the 
spoken word has an edge over the written word because the 
latter cannot respond, clarify, or restrict the interpretive dis-
cretion of a reader in the same way that a speaker can in the 
context of conversation. Yet, Plato (n.d.) is explicit on the 
point that speech is no more valuable than writing if “not 
with any view to criticism or instruction.” Here it is useful to 
invoke Habermas’ (1979) distinction between genuine com-
municative action, where the speakers’ only aim is to reach 
understanding,2 and linguistically mediated strategic action, 
where instrumental aims interfere with or replace the goal of 
reaching understanding.
Needless to say, in real-world face-to-face exchanges, 
unalloyed communicative action is known only by approxi-
mation. But there are very good reasons to think that the dis-
tance between the ideal (namely, communicative action) and 
the real is especially wide in the context of the quasi-spoken 
digital media used to construct (and respond to) the gender-
critical case against trans inclusion. Stock (2019f) herself, 
discussing the reception of her arguments, has complained 
about countless “half-arsed takedown attempts” by “online 
philosophers,” crediting, conversely, philosophers she meets 
offline with “interesting, constructive, and charitable” objec-
tions. She also notes that social media siphons “users into 
paranoid, angry silos” (Stock, 2019d), and that “when read-
ing disembodied words on a screen” it is “easy enough” to 
engage in “projection” (Stock, 2019a). Why and how do 
social media and allied platforms have this potential for dis-
torting genuine communicative action?
First, they enable new manipulative communication prac-
tices, such as flaming and trolling. The popular support base of 
gender-critical academics makes ample use of these, though 
gender-critical scholars are also at the receiving end. Rather 
than using the quasi-spoken features of social media and allied 
platforms with a view to genuinely advancing understanding, 
online activists may exploit these features for strategic aims. 
Common techniques include drowning a post or blog with 
irrelevant comments; exposing the blogger to ridicule; deflect-
ing attention from the point she made; forcing her to address 
spurious objections; pretextually professing a failure to under-
stand, demanding endless further explanations; and so on. 
Some of these techniques are available in spoken exchanges, 
but social media and allied platforms magnify their power by 
enabling “widely-distributed individuals to organize and gal-
vanize around issues of common interest [or] political advo-
cacy” (Stewart, 2016); and by facilitating the use of nonverbal 
or nonargument-based, but effective, communicative devices, 
such as memes, gifs, and emoticons.
Another way in which these digital media distort genuine 
communicative action is by affecting the motivations of the 
blogger, or micro-blogger, herself. Specifically, they facili-
tate the interference with genuinely communicative goals 
(reaching understanding) by noncommunicative, strategic 
aims. I will discuss three: acquiring influence, career pro-
gression, and venting.
In traditional academic communicative practice, one’s 
recognition as an expert is supposed to follow from the credit 
that accrues to one as a result of the soundness of one’s 
research methods and arguments, judged through peer-
review processes. But “in the era of social media there are 
now many different ways that a scientist can build their pub-
lic profile; the publication of high-quality scientific papers 
being just one” (Hall, 2014). Veletsianos and Kimmons 
(2016) have found, by examining a large data set of educa-
tion scholars’ participation on Twitter, that
being widely followed on social media is impacted by many 
factors that may have little to do with the quality of scholarly 
work . . . and . . . that participation and popularity may be 
impacted by a number of additional factors unrelated to scholarly 
merit (e.g., wit, controversy, longevity; p. 6).
Furthermore, as scholars become more popular on Twitter, 
they do so exponentially, particularly if they identify online 
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as “Professor” (calling into question the conventional wis-
dom that academic engagement with social media “leads to 
new and more egalitarian structures for scholarly dissemina-
tion”) (Veletsianos & Kimmons, 2016). As Rogers (2018) 
notes, “[s]ocial media metrics propagate this loop of well-
knownness (and constructed celebrity rather than greatness) 
by keeping score and displaying it in number badges, fol-
lower counts, and similar outward indicators.” This is also 
true of such platforms as Medium.com and the Conversation, 
which allow both bloggers and readers to keep track of the 
contributions’ stats. Social media and allied platforms, in 
sum, offer us both the opportunity and the temptation to cut 
(academic) corners in becoming “influencers,” unlike tradi-
tional peer review processes, which are designed to make 
influence and recognition a by-product of, and contingent 
on, genuine communicative action. (The Conversation, while 
only accepting academic authors, fails to require that its 
pieces be based on outputs previously published in peer-
reviewed academic outlets.)
A common instrumental reason motivating academic 
users of social media, particularly heavy users, is their per-
ception that it benefits their career advancement (Veletsianos 
et al., 2019). Indeed, career advancement appears to be the 
most significant factor associated with being an academic 
“super user” of social media (that is, one who frequently 
posts “updates on their research”), particularly when com-
pared with other motivational factors, such as the belief that 
communicating research benefits the public, or contributes 
to scientific discovery (Zhu & Purdam, 2017). Relevantly to 
the context of the debate on trans inclusion, social media 
academic “super users” appear “to be based in the humani-
ties and social sciences” (Zhu & Purdam, 2017). In the 
United Kingdom, where institutions encourage academics 
to engage with blogging and social media (Kieslinger, 
2015), the perception that social media engagement is ben-
eficial for one’s career seems well-founded. Zhu and Purdam 
(2017) point out that in the 2014 Research Excellence 
Framework (REF), some “impact statements” cited the 
numbers of a scholar’s Twitter followers; and in the United 
States there have been calls for formally embedding evalua-
tion of the use of online social media in academic career 
progression processes (Grudz et al., 2011). Digital platforms 
themselves are unapologetic in marketing themselves to 
potential academic authors by drawing attention, first and 
foremost, to the benefits that might accrue to the scholar’s 
recognition and career, rather than the state of our collective 
understanding of the world. Thus, the Conversation’s (nd-a) 
“Writing, pitching and training guide for academics” opens 
by giving data about the size of the Conversation’s reader-
ship, then immediately goes on to state, “The Conversation 
UK helps raise the profile of you, your work, and your 
university, positioning you as an expert voice to address 
a global audience” (emphasis in original). Undoubtedly, 
the desires for career progression and for recognition have 
always been one of the drivers behind engagement with 
traditional scholarly publishing, too. But the potential for 
these motivating factors’ interfering with the quality of aca-
demic communication is diminished by the peer-review pro-
cesses and standards characteristic of traditional academic 
fora.
Blogs and social media also distort genuine communica-
tive action by facilitating venting. This is partly because they 
distance interlocutors in a way that lowers benign face-to-
face inhibitions. This is a well-recognized online phenome-
non (Suler, 2004). While the prospect and practice of 
peer-review processes tend to reduce (though they might not 
eliminate) ad-hominem attacks, unproductively antagonistic 
posturing, and the poor argumentation that comes with them, 
similar checks are not in place in the context of nonacademic 
digital fora. In the debate on trans inclusion, this has some-
times resulted in a kind of communication that is a far cry 
from the dialogic, respectful attitude that Habermasian com-
municative action, let alone empathy-centered feminist 
forms of communicative ethics, calls for—Admittedly, 
gender-critical feminists reject the exhortation to be empathic 
as a “gendered expectation” (Allen et al., 2019), but experi-
ence of receiving feedback on drafts of this article suggests 
they are mistaken. Despite recognizing the potential of social 
media for encouraging “sneering,” “dehumanizing,” “insult-
ing,” and threatening language (Stock, 2019d), Stock herself, 
as many others, has fallen prey to online incivility: In a 
Medium.com piece, she refers to fellow-feminists who do 
not share her predictions as possibly “quite thick” (Stock, 
2019c, emphasis in original). The problem is that “impolite 
and incensed blog comments can polarize online users based 
on value predispositions utilized as heuristics when process-
ing the blog’s information” (Anderson et al., 2014, p. 383).
Digital incivility is not the only mechanism that may 
result in compromised thought processes in the blogosphere 
and social media. First, it has been theorized that the very 
pacing of “real-time” online communication—in compress-
ing the interval between a post and responses to it—encour-
ages interlocutors to default to heuristics, leading to 
cognitive bias (Menzies & Newson, 2007, p. 93). Second, 
use of social media to debate political issues may result in 
dulling our critical faculties by enabling large-scale, reiter-
ated distribution of disinformation: “people are more likely 
to be affected by inaccurate information if they see more 
and more recent messages” (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 40).
Third, the quality of our political thinking is diminished by 
participation in cohesive social networks (Erisen & Erisen, 
2012); and scholars using social media find them especially 
congenial to build just such networks. They do so by 
“zero[ing] in on shared attributes or outlooks,” and creating 
a sort of “hyper-personal communication,” where “com-
puter-mediated intimacy . . . may be stronger than [that] 
established face-to-face” (Stewart, 2016). This seems con-
sistent with findings that social media “may facilitate 
greater selective exposure” to “attitude-consistent informa-
tion about politics” (Tucker et al., 2018, p. 53). Indeed, and 
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perversely, even exposure to opposing views on social 
media can increase, rather than reduce, polarization for 
some demographics (Bail et al., 2018).
In sum, the use of social media (and other digital plat-
forms, to the extent that they share some of the same attri-
butes) poses a number of concerns in respect of their ability 
to facilitate genuine communicative action, particularly 
when compared with traditional academic publication out-
lets. This being the case, the enthusiasm with which many 
gender-critical voices have embraced these media may well 
be implicated in the problems with their arguments against 
trans inclusion; likewise, it is unclear that engaging gender-
critical voices on that terrain has been the most productive 
move on the part of those of us who advocate for trans 
inclusion.
Conclusion
Cooper (2019) has invoked a legal pluralist perspective to 
argue that it is possible, and may be desirable, for gender 
as conceived by gender-critical feminists (as “sex-based 
domination”) and gender as conceived in trans-affirming 
terms (as “identity diversity”) to coexist side-by-side in 
the law. Access to women’s spaces is just the kind of policy 
matter that need not choose between one conception of 
gender and the other: it can and should be granted on the 
basis of both. While a compelling feminist case has been 
made for inclusion (Finlayson et al., 2018), the best femi-
nist case against inclusion suffers from a number of argu-
mentative fallacies (Aristotle, n.d.), and is at odds with 
well-established and sound uses of practical reason. Many 
problems in gender-critical thought are consistent with the 
explanation that paranoid structuralism is too often presup-
posed in gender-critical work, rather than being treated, 
productively, as a hypothesis. The nature of the publication 
outlets favored by gender-critical feminists (social media, 
blogs, etc.) is also likely to be implicated in generating 
some of these problems.
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Notes
1. Consider the case of a privately funded shelter for victims of 
domestic violence: The sensible course of conduct may well 
be not to enforce a requirement of access without discrimina-
tion on the ground of gender reassignment, if the only alterna-
tive is to deny all women such protection (because, say, the 
funders will stop supporting the shelter if nondiscriminatory 
access is enforced).
2. For Habermas (1984), speakers reach understanding by vin-
dicating—in light of applicable criteria: truth, legitimacy, and 
sincerity—the validity claims they make for their statements. 
This model may appear to be biased toward rationalist episte-
mologies, but Wright (2004) argues that Habermas’ discursive 
model of moral judgment makes appropriate room for affect, 
and incorporates a conception of impartiality predicated on 
one’s taking another’s perspective in all its particularity.
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